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14
15 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
16 **(OAKLAND DIVISION)**

17 **IN RE: COLLEGE ATHLETE NIL**
18 **LITIGATION**

Case No. 4:20-cv-03919-CW

19 **OBJECTOR THOMAS**
CASTELLANOS' REPLY
20 **SUPPORTING HIS MOTION TO**
STRIKE PARTIES' PROPOSED
21 **AMENDED CLASS ACTION**
SETTLEMENT

22 Hon. Claudia Wilken

23
24 Class Member/ Objector Thomas Castellanos files this Reply, further
25 supporting his Motion to Strike the Parties' Proposed Amended Class Action
26 Settlement, showing the Court that the proposed, unclear amendments that attempt
27 to identify additional releasees, adversely impact class members by broadening the
28

1 release and thus should be stricken.¹ For the reasons stated in Objector Castellanos’
 2 objection, opposition to final approval, his original motion, and herein, the motion
 3 should be granted.

4 **The proposed amendment should be stricken because Objector’s**
 5 **factual contentions remain unanswered and due process prohibits**
 6 **the expansion of the releasees.**

7 The parties’ new definition, which fails in its attempt to define the term
 8 “College Football Playoff” as four separate entities, is not a “clarification,” but a
 9 further obfuscation and falsification to the settlement agreement. “College Football
 10 Playoff” is not a legal person or entity. As a non-entity, “College Football Playoff”
 11 lacked the legal capacity to sue or be sued, *see, e.g., Nat’l Grange of the Ord. of*
 12 *Patrons of Husbandry v. California Guild*, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1065 (E.D. Cal.
 13 2018), and thus its inclusion as a releasee was non-sensical. The parties’ amendment
 14 to clarify does exactly what they argue it does not do: it adds entities to be released
 15 under the settlement. (*Cf.* Doc. 812 at 2 (contending that the change “did not modify,
 16 e.g., add to, which entities are to be released by the settlement”) There was no
 17 entity released as “College Football Playoff” in the Settlement Agreement that was
 18 operative when the absent class members made their opt-out decision, but the new
 19 definition attempts to add four new releasees by amendment.

20 Plaintiffs attempt to defend the inclusion of the four new entities as purported
 21 “affiliates” of or entities or persons related to “College Football Playoff.” (Doc. 812 at
 22 4, n. 3.) But that defense fails because a non-entity obviously does not have parent or
 23 subsidiary entities, officers, directors, trustees, etc. And the affiliate clause expressly
 24 applies only to “the foregoing **persons or entities.**” *See id.* (emphasis added)

25 Indeed, the new definition creates additional confusion for two of the
 26 additional releasees. First, “College Football Playoff Foundation,” is not a legal

27 ¹ The Court struck Objector Castellanos’ hearing date. Further, despite his
 28 agreement to file an expedited reply by Friday, April 25, 2025, the Court granted
 Plaintiffs’ motion to move the reply date to Tuesday, April 22, 2025 – despite the
 holiday weekend and Objector’s counsel’s other professional obligations.

1 entity, and naming “College Football Playoff Foundation” as a releasee suffers from
 2 the same problems as originally naming “College Football Playoff” as a separate
 3 releasee. Moreover, while “CFP Administration, LLC” or a BCS Properties LLC
 4 entity that signed the \$7.8 billion contract to broadcast college football playoff games
 5 for the next decade could – at least hypothetically – be contributing as to “media
 6 rights” under Part 11 of the NCAA’s 2024 Agreed-Upon Procedures, none of the
 7 categories cited by the Defendants (and parroted by Plaintiffs) appear to have any
 8 connection to a non-profit foundation contributing any amounts to the proposed
 9 settlement.²

10 Further, the definition alleges that “BCS Properties, LLC” is a Delaware
 11 entity, but an entity with that name was formed and exists under the laws of the
 12 State of Kansas. How many “BCS Properties, LLCs” are there, and are they all being
 13 added to release via amendment?

14 The amendment itself admits the inadequacy of the original releasee language.
 15 And this admission – let alone the parties’ failure to identify if, how, and what the
 16 newly identified parties contribute to the proposed settlement – precludes the
 17 attempted retroactive amendment of the proposed Settlement Agreement. Class
 18 members lacked critical information as to the identity of the releasees when they
 19 were evaluating whether to remain in the class and participate in the settlement or
 20 to opt out. New releasees have since been added, expanding the scope of the release
 21 and thus materially and adversely affecting class members. *See In re Anthem, Inc.*
 22 *Data Breach Litig.*, 327 F.R.D. 299, 330 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (explaining that the
 23 “pertinent question” in deciding whether settlement agreement changes require
 24 additional notice to the class before final approval is “whether the changes *adversely*
 25 affect class members.”) (emphasis in original).

26
 27 ² Indeed, the parties’ mere repetition of the alleged parts of the NCAA’s AUP
 28 purportedly applicable to “College Football Playoff” settlement contribution fails to
 explain how, or in what amount or percentage, the alleged revenues pass through
 any specified entity.

1 The proposed amendment should be stricken and the request for Final
 2 Approval denied unless and until the class receives Notice of this amendment to the
 3 releasees section – and the amendments proposed based on other objections – as well
 4 as information sufficient to determine how much and how the newly identified
 5 releasees are contributing to the settlement. Class members must be given the
 6 opportunity to re-evaluate the proposed settlement and determine whether, in light
 7 of the amended information, they wish to participate in the proposed amended
 8 settlement or opt out.

9 Due process requires that class members to receive notice of the rights they
 10 are giving up. In *Hendricks v. Starkist Co.*, like here, the named parties stipulated to
 11 a change in the scope of the release in a class action settlement agreement after the
 12 Court's preliminary approval and after class notice was distributed. *See* No. 13-CV-
 13 00729-HSG, 2016 WL 692739, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016). Over the parties'
 14 protests, the *Hendricks* Court determined that the amendments could not be
 15 permitted, explaining:

16 Having not received the amended release, potential class
 17 members did not have any notice of the rights they are
 18 actually giving up with regard to these new claims. Under
 19 these circumstances, a change in the scope of the
 20 settlement's release constitutes a substantive change in the
 21 settlement's terms and is a change that affects class
 22 members' rights under the agreement. Given that class
 members did not receive notice of the amended release, the
 parties cannot establish that class members have been
 informed of the consequences of remaining in the class or
 opting out. The parties have not satisfied minimum due
 process requirements.

23 *Id.* (footnotes omitted). Thus, the *Hendricks* Court could not conclude that the
 24 proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, or adequate and denied final approval,
 25 without prejudice. *Id.* at *4.

26 Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish the *Hendricks* Court's analysis fails. While
 27 the undefined, non-entity "College Football Playoff" was listed as a releasee in the
 28 first iterations of the settlement agreement, no legal entity or person was being

1 released under that term. But now, after Notice was provided (and the opt-out date
 2 had passed), the parties have attempted, via a new definition, to identify (with
 3 partial success) four new releasees. Thus, class members did not have notice of the
 4 rights that the parties now contend that they were giving up. The parties thus cannot
 5 demonstrate that class members received notice of this substantive change in the
 6 release (or any other amendment proposed by the parties) or been informed of the
 7 consequences of remaining in the class or opting out. Absent class members' due
 8 process rights thus have not been satisfied, and the parties cannot show that their
 9 proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, or adequate.

10 Pending a clear amendment that identifies the legal entities to be released and
 11 demonstrates how these newly identified releasees are contributing to the proposed
 12 settlement, if at all, the parties' proposed amendment must be stricken, and the
 13 requested final approval denied.³

14 Conclusion

15 For the foregoing reasons, the parties' proposed amendment expanding the
 16 releasees is due to be stricken and the request for final approval denied.

17
 18 Respectfully submitted.

This 22nd day of April, 2025.

19 By: Michael L. McGlamry

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25 ³ Objector Castellanos opposes final approval. His goal, aligned with the Court's, is to
 26 get this resolved correctly and to protect the absent class members and their due
 27 process rights. Accordingly, if the Court were to grant final approval, he is hopeful
 28 that the Court, in the exercise of her broad discretion, will stay the application of the
 settlement – particularly the injunctive portion – pending appeal. Otherwise, more
 than 25,000 student-athletes will lose their roster positions, regardless of the
 outcome on appeal. *See Doe #1 v. Trump*, 957 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2020)
 (quoting *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009)).

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY on April 22, 2025, I filed the foregoing with the Court by uploading to the CM/ECF system for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and that a true and correct copy was served on all Registered parties via Notice of Electronic Filing.

By: Michael L. McGlamry
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An Attorney for Objector Michael Castellanos